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Abstract
Excessive borrowing by subnational governments is considered to be one of the perils of ﬁscal
decentralization. On the other hand, ﬁscal decentralization might ensure the ﬁscal stability of the public
sector by constraining Leviathan governments. Since the impact of decentralized government on ﬁscal
outcomes is therefore ambiguous from a theoretical perspective, we explore this question empirically
with a panel of 17 OECD countries over the 1975-2001 period. Our ﬁndings suggest that expenditure
decentralization signiﬁcantly reduces public indebtedness, whereas tax decentralization and vertical ﬁscal
imbalances are insigniﬁcant.
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Public debt, Soft budget constraints
( H71, H77, H30)
1 Introduction
Public sector decentralization has become an important policy goal of major international
organizations. The World Bank, for example, claims that ﬁscal decentralization, when carefully
implemented, can decrease political instability, increase government eﬃciency, and contribute to
the overall level of welfare (World Bank 2000); and it thus has supported several decentralization
projects in its client countries during the last two decades (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Group 2008).
Within economics, the presumption that ﬁscal decentralization has primarily beneﬁcial
consequences stems from two lines of thought. First, from the famous decentralization theorem,
which states that a decentralized provision of public goods is capable of addressing varying
preferences between inhabitants of geographically and culturally disparate regions (Oates 1972;
Tiebout 1956); and second from the Public Choice tradition, where it is argued that the division
of the state into several tiers and the existence of competing jurisdictions restricts the ability of
Leviathan governments to over-tax citizens (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
This sympathetic outlook on ﬁscal decentralization has not remained without criticism, and
several potential drawbacks have been identiﬁed in the literature. For example, it is well known
that ﬁscal decentralization might decrease the ability of governments to conduct stabilization
policies and to redistribute income (Musgrave 1959). The primary reason for a growing
disenchantment, however, is that ﬁscal decentralization may distort the incentives of subnational
and federal politicians if it is ill-designed. This drawback, it is often argued, causes decentralized
states to be more prone to macroeconomic instability, higher deﬁcits, and unsustainable levels of
debt (Goodspeed 2002).
Yet while both theoretical contributions and case studies seem to indicate that ﬁscal
decentralization leads to suboptimal ﬁscal and economic outcomes, systematic econometric
evidence remains scarce. This paper therefore aims to explore empirically the validity of this
claim with panel data for 17 OECD countries over the 1975-2001 period. To this end, we review
in section 2 the empirical and theoretical literature on ﬁscal decentralization and public ﬁnances
more thoroughly. In section 3, we describe how we operationalize the general notion of ﬁscal
decentralization, and discuss the dependent and the independent variables used in the
econometric analysis. In section 4, we discuss our speciﬁcation and introduce the empirical
model. In section 5, the results are presented. In section 6, we conclude.
2 Literature Review
One important strand of the literature on ﬁscal federalism argues that decentralization
endangers the ﬁscal stability of the public sector by causing “soft budget constraints”.1 In the
relevant contributions, a principal-agent relationship between federal and subnational
governments is assumed, and conditions under which moral hazard might prevail on the latter’s
part are identiﬁed.
Goodspeed (2002), for example, develops a model that covers two periods. In the ﬁrst period,
subnational governments provide a local public good by either taxing citizens or by borrowing.
The objective of the federal government is to maximize its reelection probability. This
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probability is modeled as a function of net-consumption levels in each jurisdiction. Since second
period net-consumption in a jurisdiction is diminished by ﬁrst-period debt because subnational
governments have to repay the principal and interest, the federal government can increase
net-consumption and thus the probability of its reelection by granting appropriate bailout
transfers. These incentives of the federal government are taken into account by subnational
governments in the ﬁrst stage, i. e., when they decide on the level of borrowing – which leads to
ineﬃciently high levels of subnational borrowing.2
Apart from the soft budget constraint concept, there are alternative, albeit related, arguments
as to why ﬁscal decentralization could contribute to ﬁscal imbalances. A strand of the literature
in concerned with the impact of intergovernmental transfer schemes. The basic idea behind these
approaches is that vertical transfers might contribute to common pool problems. If the federal
government allocates grants to subnational jurisdictions at its discretion, the latter have an
incentive to appear as if they are needy: They might then run high deﬁcits in order to “prove”
that they are under-ﬁnanced. Since the marginal cost of federal funds is distributed over the
whole federation whereas the beneﬁts are concentrated within each individual jurisdiction, such a
behavior is reasonable from the perspective of individual subnational governments (Weingast
et al. 1981).
Another strand of the literature is concerned with the “technical” problems of coordinating
the policies of diﬀerent tiers of government. If there are several independent governments which
may spend and tax at their own discretion, a concerted ﬁscal policy could be impossible to
maintain, and might manifest itself in a deﬁcit-bias at all tiers of government (De Mello 1999).
While a considerable number of contributions address the possibility that decentralized states
could exhibit a deﬁcit bias, only few theoretical studies try to argue that ﬁscal decentralization
might induce subnational and federal politicians to reduce the level of indebtedness. Thus, more
indirect arguments, which essentially address diﬀerent issues, must be drawn upon.
Public Choice theory has made important contributions in this respect. In this literature, the
government is perceived as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan, and ﬁscal decentralization is
believed to force governments to refrain from expropriatory taxation because citizens can leave
jurisdictions where the government behaves as a revenue-maximizer (Hayek 1939; Brennan and
Buchanan 1980).3 Also, contrary to the traditional view that tax sharing arrangements and
vertical ﬁscal imbalances lead to ineﬃciencies by enabling governments to “collude” and thereby
avoid the competitive pressures generated by ﬁscal decentralization, there are some arguments in
this literature which suggest that they can be welfare-enhancing. For example, Ko¨thenbu¨rger
(2005) shows that equalization schemes can complement tax competition in achieving more
eﬃciency by indirectly “taxing” the tax revenue extracted by Leviathan governments.
These Public Choice arguments can be adapted straightforwardly to explain public
indebtedness by arguing that levels of debt should be lower when citizens take future tax burdens
into account in their mobility decisions, or if these are capitalized in residential property prices.
The question of how ﬁscal decentralization is related to debt accumulation is not well explored
in the empirical literature. Rather, the impact of ﬁscal decentralization on the size of
government seems to have evoked more interest among applied econometricians.4 Oates (1985),
for example, explores Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis both with US state-level
data and with international data, but fails to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship. On the other hand,
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using time-series data at the federal level, Marlow (1988) ﬁnds that ﬁscal decentralization is
negatively related to total government size in the United States.
In a study with panel data on 32 industrial and developing countries, Jin and Zou (2002)
reach more diﬀerentiated conclusions by disaggregating the general concept of ﬁscal
decentralization into diﬀerent “representations”. That is, they recognize that ﬁscal
decentralization could either pertain to the expenditure or the revenue side of the budget, and
that the eﬀects might vary according to the side of the budget that is considered. Indeed, they
discover the existence of conﬂictive eﬀects. Their results conﬁrm that it is important to perceive
ﬁscal decentralization as a general concept that encompasses several diﬀerent aspects. That is,
expenditure and revenue decentralization, and vertical ﬁscal imbalances (i. e., diﬀerences between
subnational expenditure and revenue autonomy) should be treated as diﬀerent and independent
representations of ﬁscal decentralization, and analyzed as such.
The fact that there is only a limited number of studies on the impact of ﬁscal decentralization
on government indebtedness does not imply that researchers have not attempted to analyze the
determinants of public debt in general. On the contrary, there is a large literature that is
concerned with this issue, and recognizing the contributions therein is important for the correct
speciﬁcation of the econometric model further below.
Since the traditional “normative” approaches explain the varying levels of indebtedness
between countries only insuﬃciently,5 the more recent literature tends to focus on “political”
explanations (Alesina and Perotti 1995). One line of research explores whether there are
ideological diﬀerences in the borrowing policies of governments. Two noteworthy studies are
Neck and Getzner (2001), who conduct a case study on the politico-economic determinants of
public debt growth in Austria; and Seitz (2000), who analyses the determinants of subnational
deﬁcits in Germany. Both studies, however, ﬁnd that economic factors are generally more
relevant than ideological variables.
Another line of research on the political determinants of public debt explores whether
government fragmentation (in parliamentary systems) or, respectively, divided government (in
presidential systems) has an eﬀect on ﬁscal outcomes. The theoretical expectation is that the
common pool problem is more severe when governments consist of many coalition partners
(parliamentary systems) or when diﬀerent parties control the presidency and the legislature
(presidential systems). Volkerink and de Haan (2001) indeed ﬁnd that some forms of fragmented
government lead to larger deﬁcits. However, Elgie and McMenamin (2008) show that their
results cannot be generally replicated when a diﬀerent sample is used.
The eﬀect of ﬁscal institutions on public borrowing is also analyzed in several studies. Feld
and Kirchga¨ssner (2001), for example, argue that direct-democratic institutions like budget
referendums might prevent ineﬃcient and selﬁsh actions by politicians who operate within the
general framework of a representative democracy. In their empirical analysis with panel data on
Swiss municipalities, they indeed ﬁnd that such direct democratic institutions lead to lower
public indebtedness. With respect to the United States, Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) reach the
same conclusion for “guaranteed debt”.
A related literature studies the impact of budget procedures on debt accumulation. Both
numerical as well as procedural rules have been analyzed. Examples of numerical rules are the
budget balance requirements in US states or the Maastricht criteria that stipulate, inter alia,
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upper limits for public debt and/or deﬁcits. Procedural rules, on the other hand, relate to the
stringency of the procedures that govern the various stages at which the budget is formulated.
Cabase´s et al. (2007), for example, explore the eﬀectiveness of borrowing restrictions with data
on Spanish municipalities, and ﬁnd that they impose some discipline on the borrowing policies of
local governments. Lagona and Padovano (2007) criticize the methodology with which the
impact of budget rules is usually analyzed. They argue that the application of indices to measure
the stringency of rules implies the need for arbitrary classiﬁcations. Instead, they propose a
nonlinear principal component analysis approach. However, their results, too, indicate that more
stringent rules lead to larger ﬁscal balances and smaller budget sizes. Using data on US states,
Bohn and Inman (1996) also conﬁrm the ﬁnding that ﬁscal outcomes are signiﬁcantly related to
budget rules.
As stated above, there are only a few empirical studies which primarily consider the impact of
ﬁscal decentralization on ﬁscal balances.6 De Mello (2000) focuses on the eﬀect of ﬁscal
decentralization on the deﬁcit of the federal and subnational governments separately. He ﬁnds
that subnational tax autonomy generally leads to an increase in subnational deﬁcits, which
implies that decentralization might aggravate soft budget constraints and coordination failures.
Fornasari et al. (2000) ﬁnd in their study on 32 developing and industrial countries that
expenditure decentralization generally contributes to a larger government sector, but that
subnational deﬁcits are unrelated to the ﬁscal balance of the central government. However, once
a revenue measure of decentralization is used, decentralization turns out to be negatively related
to central government budget deﬁcits. They also diﬀerentiate between a “long-run” analysis
using cross-section averages and a “short-run” analysis using the within-panel variation, and ﬁnd
that expenditure decentralization increases central government deﬁcits when the within-variation
is used.
Freitag and Vatter (2008) ﬁnd in a study with data from Switzerland that more decentralized
cantons tend to have smaller deﬁcits in times of economic crisis. However, they fail to observe
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between centralized and decentralized cantons when the economy is doing
well.
Further studies on this and related questions are Stein (1998), who observes that
decentralization expands the public sector’s size but not the deﬁcit of the total government
sector in Latin America; Rodden (2002) who controls in some models for the degree of revenue
and expenditure decentralization, and ﬁnds that both tend to increase total government deﬁcits;
and Schaltegger and Feld (2009) who ﬁnd for Switzerland that less centralized cantons are more
likely to conduct successful ﬁscal adjustments.
Our review of the literature shows that some studies ﬁnd that ﬁscal decentralization endangers
the ﬁscal stability of the public sector, while others point in the opposite direction. Since each
study estimates idiosyncratic models and uses diﬀerent datasets, the existing literature is by no
means conclusive, which suggests that it might be worthwhile to accumulate additional evidence
on this issue. We can think of two major drawbacks of existing studies. First, most studies use
questionable variables for measuring the degree of ﬁscal decentralization and might thus reach
wrong conclusions. Second, the focus on subnational instead of consolidated government
borrowing might be problematic because ﬁscal decentralization, if it indeed leads to ineﬃciencies,
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must not necessarily lead to a worsening of subnational ﬁnances. We describe in the next section
how we try to address these drawbacks.
3 Data
Since both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that decentralization might have an
impact on public ﬁnances but do not oﬀer a clear ﬁnding, we explore the question further with
the following innovations: First, by using a new measure which captures the eﬀective (or “real”)
degree of tax decentralization better than those variables that are traditionally used; second, by
using data on consolidated government debt instead on federal and subnational debt or deﬁcits
separately; third, by using panel data; and fourth, by conducting several robustness checks.
3.1 Decentralization measures
A major problem for applied econometric work in ﬁscal federalism is to ﬁnd an accurate measure
of ﬁscal decentralization. Most authors use indicators derived from the IMF’s GFS yearbook.7 It
is widely recognized that these measures do not necessarily capture the true degree of
subnational autonomy and importance (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). On the expenditure side, they
do not distinguish whether subnational governments decide on the level and composition of
expenditures autonomously, or whether they simply act as spending agencies of the federal
government. On the revenue side, they do not distinguish whether subnational governments have
autonomous revenue-raising powers, or whether revenues originate mostly from federal grants
and tax sharing arrangements. An additional problem with the IMF’s GFS measures is that they
are incomplete insofar as many values are missing.
Despite these shortcomings, we use two variables derived from the IMF’s GFS yearbook and
made available in a World Bank dataset to measure the degree of expenditure decentralization
and the vertical ﬁscal imbalance. The measure for expenditure decentralization is constructed as
usual by simply dividing all expenditures made by subnational governments by total government
expenditures, while the measure for the vertical ﬁscal imbalance is constructed by dividing
subnational revenues from federal grants by total subnational revenues. While recognizing that
these measures are not without fault, we nonetheless believe that they provide a satisfactory
approximation of these important aspects of subnational autonomy. Furthermore, this particular
World Bank database is the only dataset of which we are aware that provides these measures (i)
for all OECD countries, (ii) with a panel structure, and (iii) in an easily accessible way.
We call the ﬁrst measure, since it relies of subnational expenditures, simply expenditure
decentralization, and the second measure, since it relies of the share of grants received by
subnational governments, grant share.
Measures more accurate than those from the IMF’s GFS yearbook for the degree of tax
decentralization are provided in a database constructed by Stegarescu (2005). Building on a
particular classiﬁcation of tax revenues put forward in OECD (1999), Stegarescu derives three
diﬀerent indicators of tax decentralization. These indicators are constructed by diﬀerentiating
subnational taxes with regard to the degree of autonomy subnational governments have over
them. Tax revenue is classiﬁed as originating from: (i) taxes for which subnational governments
determine both rates and bases (“own taxes”), (ii) the ﬁrst type of taxes plus shared taxes for
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which subnational governments are involved in determining the revenue split (“shared taxes”),
and (iii) the ﬁrst two types of taxes plus all remaining taxes. The tax decentralization measures
are then calculated by dividing the tax revenue in each of the three classes by total government
tax revenues.
Even though three diﬀerent measures are provided in Stegarescu (2005), we use in this study
primarily the ﬁrst variable. In the following, we label this variable tax decentralization. We
conﬁne ourselves to this variable (except in a robustness check8) for two reasons. First, since in
our sample subnational governments have control over the revenue split for shared taxes only in
four countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain), the second measure adds little
information to the ﬁrst. Furthermore, two out of these four countries (Austria and Germany)
display almost no variation over time in this variable. The third measure from the Stegarescu
dataset, on the other hand, is discarded because it lumps all types of taxes together. It is
therefore not much diﬀerent from the revenue decentralization measure reported in the IMF’S
GFS yearbook.
A concise description of the measures of ﬁscal decentralization that are used in this study and
their sources is provided in table 1. Summary statistics are provided in table 2. A
cross-correlation matrix between them can be found in table 3. [insert tables 1, 2, and 3 here] In
Figure 1, we show the evolution of their average value for the countries in our sample over time.
[insert Figure 1 here]
The correlation matrix shows that expenditure and tax decentralization are fairly strongly and
positively correlated. Expectedly, the grant share and tax decentralization variables are
negatively correlated. The correlation of the expenditure decentralization and the grant share
variables also is negative, but somewhat weaker. These ﬁndings suggest that (i) in OECD
countries additional subnational expenditures tend to be ﬁnanced with “own taxes”, and (ii)
that “own tax” revenues and grant receipts are substitutes in ﬁnancing subnational jurisdictions.
Both the summary statistics and Figure 1 suggest that expenditures have been more
decentralized than taxes for the whole period of our analysis.9
3.2 Dependent and independent variables
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the dependent and control variables that we use in our
econometric models. The variables, their deﬁnitions and their sources are listed in table 4. We
report summary statistics on the variables used in the baseline models in table 5. Summary
statistics on the variables used in the robustness checks and the instrumental variables
regressions can be found in table 6. [insert tables 4, 5, and 6 here]
We use as our primary measure of debt the net ﬁnancial liabilities of the general government.
Net ﬁnancial liabilities are preferred to gross ﬁnancial liabilities because they take both public
assets and liabilities into account. Obviously, if the government uses debt to acquire some
ﬁnancial or physical asset, the fact that its net ﬁnancial position remains unchanged should be
mirrored by the data. We consider the liabilities of the general government instead of those of
the central or subnational tier only because subnational over-borrowing must not necessarily lead
to deterioration of subnational ﬁnances when the center quietly increases transfers (and vice
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versa). Neglecting this issue might lead to the wrong conclusions with regard to the impact of
ﬁscal decentralization.
Data on net ﬁnancial liabilities for the 1975-2001 period is available from the OECD, but the
time series for some countries (e. g., Spain) are rather short and exhibit several missing values.
While net ﬁnancial liabilities are our preferred measure of government debt, we also conduct
further below robustness checks with alternative measures. In particular, we consider gross
ﬁnancial liabilities and government debt calculated according to the requirements of the
Maastricht treaty.10
We use several economic, demographic and political control variables that might be important
determinants of ﬁscal outcomes, and at the same time correlated with ﬁscal decentralization. We
discuss in this section the variables included in the baseline models. The variables used in the
robustness checks are discussed in subsequent sections.
The population variable is included to control for scale and/or congestion eﬀects in the
production of public goods. If the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale
because of the scarcity of some factor (e. g., land), increased expenditure requirements might
lead to an expansion of debt. Even though we scale the debt burden for the size of the economy
by dividing it by GDP, a country’s population size could still have an additional independent
eﬀect, and omitting it might lead to biased estimates because more populous states might be
also more decentralized (Treisman 2002).11
GDP growth and the unemployment rate are included to control for business cycle eﬀects. The
inﬂation rate is included because deﬁcit-ﬁnance and an expansion of the money supply are
alternative ways to fund public expenditures. The working age variable, which measures the
share of the population between 15 and 65, is included to control for the extent that
income-earners can shoulder the current and future tax burden due to the existing stock of debt.
We control for the ideology of the ruling party at the federal level by including an index that
runs from 1 (far-right) to 5 (far-left). This variable is taken from the CPDS I database
constructed by Armingeon et al. (2008). Several contributions have argued that there might be
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the ﬁscal behavior of ideologically opposed parties. For example, the
case that left-wing governments are more likely to conduct expansionary policies and to increase
inﬂation is often made (Hibbs 1977). The eﬀect of ideology on public debt is less obvious,
however. While expansionary ﬁscal policies might on the one hand lead to more spending, some
authors argue that left-wing parties are also more likely to increase taxes, with no obvious eﬀect
on the level of indebtedness (Borrelli and Royed 1995). We therefore have no strong priors with
regard to the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient.
We also include a Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, which measures the extent of government
fragmentation, since several studies suggest that more fragmented governments tend to be more
susceptible to common pool problems. This index assumes higher values when the government is
less fragmented. It is taken from the DPI 2006 dataset provided by Beck et al. (2001).
The openness variable is included to control for the eﬀect of globalization on ﬁscal outcomes.
Omitting this variable might result in biased estimates since globalization could be correlated
with the degree of ﬁscal decentralization and at the same time with public debt (Sharma 2005).
However, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient is ambiguous. On the one hand, more open
countries might be forced to implement more prudent ﬁscal policies because investors and ﬁrms
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decentralization is genuinely irrelevant for government borrowing. Note, however, that even in
these models, expenditure decentralization continues to display a negative coeﬃcient.
In order to conﬁrm that the insigniﬁcance of the expenditure decentralization variable in
models GMM 3 and 4 is due to weak instruments, we estimate a ﬁfth model (GMM 5). In this
model, we once again treat the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the unemployment, inﬂation, and interest rates
as endogenous, as we did in the fourth model, and instrument all three simultaneously. But we
also increase the number of instruments. In addition to the main set of instruments, we
additionally use the second lag of the levels of the unemployment, inﬂation, and interest rates.
The second lags are not directly related to the ﬁrst diﬀerences and thus in principle valid
instruments. While this approach is probably not perfect – i. e., using lags as instruments might
be inappropriate if the series display strong autocorrelation – the diagnostic tests in the ﬁfth
column of Table 11 perform well, thereby increasing our conﬁdence in the results.
The results in model GMM 5 conﬁrm our conjecture with respect to models GMM 3 and 4.
That is, when additional instruments are used, expenditure decentralization displays once again
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on public borrowing. Several other control variables, too, become
signiﬁcant again.
Given these results, we believe that the conclusions from the baseline models are robust to
endogeneity problems.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and public
ﬁnances. At the outset, we discussed some theoretical arguments as to why ﬁscal
decentralization might lead to unsustainable levels of debt. However, it was also pointed out that
ﬁscal decentralization might have beneﬁcial eﬀects, such as its ability to constrain ineﬃcient
government intervention, which might oﬀset the negative aspects. Therefore, an empirical
analysis seemed warranted.
In the analysis, which used both decentralization variables derived from the IMF’s GFS
yearbook (and obtained from a World Bank database) and measures provided by Stegarescu
(2005), we found that a high degree of expenditure decentralization tends to signiﬁcantly reduce
public indebtedness, while tax decentralization and vertical ﬁscal imbalances were insigniﬁcant.
That is, even though theoretical contributions tend to emphasize the dangers of ﬁscal
decentralization for ﬁscal stability, we obtained in our empirical investigations the opposite
result. It seems that ﬁscal decentralization has not been harmful in OECD countries during the
1975-2001 period. In fact, the results for expenditure decentralization indicate that more
devolution of spending authority would actually have improved the incentives of politicians to
implement sound ﬁscal policies.
This study has, in our opinion, several implications for future research. For theoretical
contributions, the fact that the three representations of ﬁscal decentralization considered by us
apparently have diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁscal outcomes implies that they should be treated as
distinct and mutually independent features of a decentralized public sector. In most existing
theoretical models, only expenditure or only tax decentralization is considered, and the other
variant usually treated as a “residual”. Hence, analyzing complex ﬁscal interactions such as
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subnational tax competition and the existence of soft budget constraints within one uniﬁed
model framework could lead to new and interesting theoretical insights.
With respect to empirical research, it might be interesting to scrutinize in more detail why the
three representations of ﬁscal decentralization have diﬀerent eﬀects. An obvious question to ask
is, for example, why exactly expenditure decentralization has such a particularly strong eﬀect in
reducing government indebtedness. Is it because subnational governments have better access to
dispersed information? Is it because they are more responsive to the wishes of their
constituencies? Or do they believe that low levels of indebtedness are an advantage in
jurisdictional competition since they signal low future taxes?
Equivalently, it might also be rewarding to explore in more detail why tax decentralization
and vertical ﬁscal imbalances seem to have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect. Do the beneﬁcial features of
tax competition such as the ability to constrain Leviathan governments exactly oﬀset the
potentially negative eﬀects resulting from, for example, horizontal tax competition? Are common
pool problems because of vertical ﬁscal imbalances held in check by the greater extent of
hierarchical control that is likely to accompany top-down ﬁnancing through federal grants? Or
do the variables that measure these features of decentralization turn out to be insigniﬁcant
because they are genuinely irrelevant for ﬁscal outcomes?
All of these are exciting questions that are likely to be of importance for the ongoing
discussion of the merits of ﬁscal decentralization.
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Notes
1See Kornai et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion of the soft budget constraint concept.
2Wildasin (1997) develops a related model to study the consequences of soft budget constraints in intergovern-
mental relations for social welfare.
3The idea that competition between public entities can improve the functioning of government must not only
apply to horizontal tax competition between subnational governments. For example, Eichenberger and Schelker
(2007) show for Swiss cantons that the existence of so called Finance Commissions, which are elected separately
from the government as an independent review body of budget decisions, leads to smaller tax burdens. However, it
should also be mentioned that there are some contributions arguing that competition by public institutions alone
is not suﬃcient to generate eﬃcient outcomes, e. g., Apolte (2001).
4There are also a number of studies that investigate the impact of ﬁscal decentralization on non-ﬁscal variables
empirically. For example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) show for US states that vertical federal transfers are associated
with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public oﬃce. They conclude on the basis of this ﬁnding that vertical
ﬁscal imbalances and soft budget constraints might lead to higher rates of corruption.
5That is, contributions which perceive the need for “consumption smoothing” and “macro-economic stabiliza-
tion” as the main determinants of the government’s borrowing policy.
17
6There are some studies which control for the impact of ﬁscal decentralization while being ultimately interested
in diﬀerent questions. For example, Singh and Plekhanov (2005) use in a study of the eﬀectiveness of subnational
borrowing restrictions a decentralization measure as a control variable. They ﬁnd in some models that decentral-
ization tends to signiﬁcantly increase subnational deﬁcits. But given that this question is not the main focus of
their analysis, this conclusion should be considered as preliminary.
7Studies which explore other dimensions of decentralization use a number of alternative measures. Political
decentralization, for example, is usually measured by whether the constitution classiﬁes a country as a federation
or as a unitary state, and by whether subnational oﬃcials are elected (Treisman 2002).
8We conduct in the empirical part of the paper a robustness check in which tax decentralization is measured by
the second variable, i. e., the one where shared taxes are also considered. However, we ﬁnd in this robustness check
that none of our results change.
9The series are shown only up to 1998 instead up to 2001 in Figure 1, because after 1998, both the expenditure
and grant share variables exhibit missing observations for many countries.
10 Government debt calculated according to the requirements of the Maastricht treaty is particularly useful for
cross-country comparisons since it is based on internationally consistent deﬁnitions. However, we do not use this
particular variable as the primary measure of debt since important federal countries such as the USA or Australia
would have to be discarded (only data for EMU member states are available), and because they do not cover
the historical post-oil price crisis period (only data from 1990 onwards are available) where the degree of ﬁscal
decentralization might have had an important eﬀect on the growth of debt.
11While other studies have found that geographical area is a more signiﬁcant predictor of ﬁscal decentralization
than population size (Treisman 2006), we do not use geographical area as a control variable in our analysis because
it is time-invariant and cannot be included in ﬁxed eﬀects models.
12Note also that some data for Germany before 1991 are unavailable in the OECD’s Economic Outlook No.
83 database. In these cases, we use previous versions of the Economic Outlook database to obtain the data for
Germany before 1991.
13Note that Belgium ceased to be a unitary country and became oﬃcially a federation in 1994. It is also sometimes
argued that Spain is eﬀectively a federation even though it still is formally unitary. Based on the variation in Belgium
(and perhaps in Spain) a federation dummy could be theoretically included in models with country ﬁxed eﬀects.
However, we would have to base the conclusions with regard to this variable on the within variation in at most two
countries. Since this does not seem to be reasonable, we do not pursue this approach any further.
14Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Iceland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United States.
15We are grateful to the referees of the journal for insisting that we investigate this issue.
16Note that we neither control for autocorrelation in the error process, which could lead to inconsistent estimates
in models with lagged dependent variables, nor take the panel characteristics of our data into account in these
regressions. They are purely explorative.
17 Note that the panel unit root tests are calculated with Eviews while the econometric models further below are
estimated with Stata. The Stata package has superior panel data facilities. However, it lacks, as far as we know, the
ability to calculate panel unit root tests with unbalanced panel data, forcing us to use the Eviews package instead
for calculating these tests.
18The reason for considering a trend for the level of variables but not for the ﬁrst diﬀerences is that the unit root
tests would be biased towards ﬁnding a unit root (and thus to conclude that the process is diﬀerence stationary)
if we do not formulate the correct alternative hypothesis. The appropriate alternative for the level variables is, in
our case, that they are trend-stationary (and therefore do not possess a unit root). For example, the net ﬁnancial
liabilities to GDP ratio has trended upwards in almost all countries in our sample. When a trend variable is not
included in the test equation, such a trending behavior can only be captured by the estimated model by ﬁnding
a unit root with drift even if the series is in reality trend stationary. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to
presume that the ﬁrst diﬀerences are trending. Therefore, trends are not considered for the unit root tests on the
ﬁrst diﬀerences. See, in particular, Elder and Kennedy (2001) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
19Eviews also displays by default in addition to the Levin-Lin-Chu test the Breitung, Im-Pesaran-Shin, ADF and
Phillips-Perron tests. For brevity, we do not report the results from these alternative tests in this paper. They
are, however, available upon request. These alternative tests lead to the same conclusion as the Levin-Lin-Chu
test with respect to the ﬁrst-diﬀerences, and unambiguously indicate that they are stationary. With respect to the
levels, there is some disagreement, e. g., sometimes the unit root hypothesis is rejected. However, in order to avoid
18
the danger of spurious correlations as far as possible, we choose to work with the hypothesis that the levels of the
variables of interest are I(1), as indicated by the Levin-Lin-Chu test.
20 Except the dummy variables and the election variable (which is a count variable).
21More formal tests (with the sktest and iqr test facilities implemented in Stata) suggest the presence of two
outliers: Belgium in 1981 and the Netherlands in 1987. Without these two observations, the hypothesis of normally
distributed residuals is never rejected. Even though these two observations seem to be outliers, we leave them
in the sample since there is no apparent reason that would justify their exclusion. Given that our sample size is
around 300, these two observations should not have an undue eﬀect on the estimated coeﬃcients. In order to be
sure, we nonetheless check further below whether our results are robust to these two and other potential outliers.
We indeed ﬁnd that the results do not change when potential outliers are excluded. In any case, the presence of a
few outliers does not indicate that the linear functional form chosen by us is wrong. That is, there is no systematic
evidence that an alternative functional form, e. g., log-log, is more appropriate.
The ﬁrst outlier is apparently generated by the fact that net ﬁnancial liabilities to GDP ratio in Belgium has
risen by a staggering 16.4 percentage points from 1980 to 1981, presumably because of the economic diﬃculties in
the wake of the second oil crisis. The second outlier is generated by the fact that the net ﬁnancial liabilities to
GDP ratio in the Netherlands has fallen by 14.8 percentage points from 1986 to 1987. In contrast to Belgium, we
have no convincing economic explanation for this large reduction. We speculate that it came about by a change in
the deﬁnition of net ﬁnancial liabilities in that particular year.
22We use the ladder and gladder diagnostic commands implemented in Stata to investigate whether transforma-
tions are necessary.
23We use the test proposed in Wooldridge (2002). That we fail to ﬁnd autocorrelation is an expected result since
(i) the model is speciﬁed in ﬁrst diﬀerences and (ii) ﬁxed eﬀects are additionally included.
24We keep the sample size constant in these models. We therefore use only those observations for which all three
decentralization variables are jointly available. This approach ensures that the results do not diﬀer merely because
of diﬀerences in the number of available observations.
25Since our dataset includes the year 2001, the last period lasts from 1996 to 2001 and is thus technically a
six-year average.
26As mentioned above, Belgium in 1981 and the Netherlands in 1987 belong to the set of excluded observations.
27Results are not shown but available upon request.
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Tab. 1: Deﬁnition and source of decentralization measures
Label Description Source
Exp. decentralization Subnational share of total government
expenditures
World Bank/ IMF GFS
Tax decentralization Subnational revenue from taxes for which
subnational governments determine rates
and/or deﬁne bases as share of general
government tax revenue
Stegarescu (2005)
Grant share Subnational revenue from federal grants
as share of total subnational revenues
World Bank/ IMF GFS
Tab. 2: Summary statistics for decentralization measures
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Exp. decent. 35.232 (14.167) 1.455 65.67 390
Tax. decent. 19.166 (15.039) 0 55.36 446
Grant share 40.239 (18.071) 5.215 86.908 384
1 Summary statistics are generally calculated with all available observations. Note that the number of observations
reported in this table is larger than the number reported in the regression tables because (i) of the use of ﬁrst-
diﬀerences to estimate the econometric models and (ii) missing values for some variables
Tab. 3: Cross-correlation between decentralization measures
Variable Exp. decent. Tax. decent. Grant share
Exp. decent. 1.000
Tax. decent. 0.677 1.000
Grant share -0.222 -0.445 1.000
1 Correlation coeﬃcients are calculated with all available observations
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Tab. 4: Deﬁnition and source of variables
Label Description Source
Baseline models
Net ﬁnancial liabilities Net ﬁnancial liabilities in % of GDP OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Population Population OECD Population and Labor Force
Dataset
GDP growth GDP per capita growth, calculated as log
diﬀerences of GDP per capita (measured
in US$, constant prices & PPP)
OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Unemployment Unemployment rate OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Inﬂation Growth in the CPI Index OECD Key Economic Indicators
Working age Share of people between 15 and 65 years OECD Population and Labor Force
Dataset
Openness Trade-to-GDP ratio OECD Macro Trade Indicators
Interest rate Long-term interest rate on government
bonds
OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Ideology Index of the ideology of government,
higher values indicate more leftist ideol-
ogy
CPDS I Dataset 1960-2006
Fragmentation Herﬁndahl index of government concen-
tration, higher values indicate less frag-
mented governments
DPI 2006 Dataset
Germany dummy Pre-uniﬁcation dummy for Germany Own calculation
Robustness checks
Gross-ﬁnancial liabilities Gross-ﬁnancial liabilities in % of GDP OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Maastricht debt Debt according to Maastricht criteria in
% of GDP
OECD Economic Outlook No. 83
Shared taxes decent. Tax decent. + subnational revenue from
taxes for which subnational governments
are involved in determining revenue split
as share of general government tax rev-
enue
Stegarescu (2005)
Instruments
EMU Dummy=1 if EMU member state and
Year > 1992
Own calculation
Election Years left in current term of government
until next election
DPI 2006 Dataset (Beck et al. 2001)
Industrial production Index of industrial production, base
year=2005
OECD Main Economic Indicators
Labor cost % Change of average cost of labor per
unit of output in industry
OECD Main Economic Indicators
Tab. 5: Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables (baseline models)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Net ﬁnancial liabilities 26.611 (34.705) -86.634 115.229 392
Population (in Mil.) 37.324 (57.305) 0.218 285.226 459
Inﬂation 7.036 (8.178) -0.691 83.95 458
Working age 66.03 (1.869) 60.78 70.157 452
Openness 62.181 (27.208) 16.1 166.35 459
GDP growth 2.065 (2.053) -8.244 7.69 459
Unemployment 6.771 (3.363) 1.064 19.108 459
Interest rate 9.859 (3.942) 4.5 29.742 442
Ideology 2.554 (1.534) 1 5 455
Fragmentation 0.703 (0.269) 0.181 1 445
Germany 0.035 (0.184) 0 1 459
1 Summary statistics are generally calculated with all available observations. Note that the number of observations reported in
this table is larger than the number reported in the regression tables because (i) of the use of ﬁrst-diﬀerences to estimate the
econometric models and (ii) missing values for some variables
Tab. 6: Summary statistics for variables used in robust and GMM models
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Gross ﬁnancial liabilities 59.289 (27.065) 7.939 140.693 401
Maastricht debt 66.726 (25.541) 13.965 134.018 143
Shared taxes decent. 23.917 (15.895) 0 55.36 446
EMU 0.222 (0.416) 0 1 459
Election 1.618 (1.27) 0 4 453
Industrial production 71.709 (16.596) 32.9 104.5 436
Labor cost 3.934 (5.629) -6.600 35.9 423
1 Summary statistics are generally calculated with all available observations. Note that the number of observations reported in
this table is larger than the number reported in the regression tables because (i) of the use of ﬁrst-diﬀerences to estimate the
econometric models and (ii) missing values for some variables
Tab. 7: Panel unit root tests
Net ﬁnancial li-
abilities
Exp. decent. Tax decent. Grant share
Levels
Levin-Lin-Chu 1.826 (0.966) 0.936 (0.825) 0.280 (0.610) -0.454 (0.325)
Obs. 354 349 403 342
First-Diﬀerences
Levin-Lin-Chu -4.981 (0.000) -7.944 (0.000) -9.843 (0.000) -8.739 (0.000)
Obs. 342 346 395 330
1 Panel unit root tests are calculated with all available observations
2 p-values in parentheses
Tab. 8: Regressions of change of debt to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975 to 2001
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE 5
Δ Population -1.038*** -1.050*** -1.040*** -1.039*** -1.053***
(-11.118) (-11.323) (-11.084) (-11.075) (-11.214)
Δ Inﬂation -0.095 -0.092 -0.101 -0.094 -0.096
(-0.587) (-0.555) (-0.620) (-0.580) (-0.581)
Δ Working age -1.822 -1.636 -1.833 -1.829 -1.655
(-1.644) (-1.439) (-1.646) (-1.643) (-1.447)
Δ Openness 0.183** 0.171** 0.185** 0.184** 0.174**
(2.176) (2.076) (2.186) (2.181) (2.075)
Δ GDP growth 0.123 0.121 0.118 0.122 0.117
(0.996) (0.987) (0.958) (0.984) (0.941)
Δ Unemployment 0.262 0.158 0.270 0.264 0.169
(1.098) (0.633) (1.141) (1.108) (0.685)
Δ Interest rate -0.543*** -0.556*** -0.540*** -0.541*** -0.552***
(-2.717) (-2.789) (-2.699) (-2.715) (-2.773)
Δ Ideology 0.438 0.473* 0.433 0.440 0.468*
(1.541) (1.689) (1.521) (1.547) (1.667)
Δ Fragmentation -0.683 -0.733 -0.681 -0.675 -0.725
(-0.389) (-0.423) (-0.384) (-0.382) (-0.413)
Germany -1.651 -1.571 -1.655 -1.661 -1.583
(-1.308) (-1.274) (-1.307) (-1.307) (-1.270)
Δ Exp. decent. -0.235** -0.229**
(-2.108) (-2.047)
Δ Tax decent. -0.051 -0.047
(-0.412) (-0.335)
Δ Grant share -0.025 -0.015
(-0.372) (-0.207)
N 293 293 293 293 293
F 34.257 30.427 33.404 32.692 28.625
푅¯2 0.439 0.444 0.437 0.437 0.440
RMS error 2.916 2.903 2.921 2.921 2.914
1 t-statistics are shown in parentheses
2 Hypothesis tests are based on robust standard errors
3 Estimates for cross-section and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not shown
Tab. 9: Regressions of change of debt to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975 to 2001;
robustness checks
Robust 1 Robust 2 Robust 3 Robust 4 Robust 5
(PCSE) (Gross debt) (Shared taxes) (Maastricht) (5 y. averages)
Δ Population -1.053*** -0.431*** -1.060*** -6.821 -0.325
(-19.467) (-4.319) (-11.185) (-1.343) (-0.615)
Δ Inﬂation -0.096 -0.081 -0.099 -0.947*** 0.120
(-0.459) (-0.365) (-0.595) (-2.781) (0.193)
Δ Working age -1.655* 0.712 -1.645 0.765 -1.746
(-1.751) (0.571) (-1.431) (0.281) (-0.951)
Δ Openness 0.174* 0.218*** 0.179** -0.098 0.575
(1.872) (2.889) (2.116) (-0.467) (1.664)
Δ GDP growth 0.117 -0.012 0.112 0.330 -0.118
(0.893) (-0.082) (0.900) (0.820) (-0.167)
Δ Unemployment 0.169 0.740** 0.162 1.393*** -0.178
(0.693) (1.991) (0.660) (3.038) (-0.247)
Δ Interest rate -0.552*** -0.354 -0.548*** 0.627 -0.935
(-3.105) (-1.353) (-2.742) (0.951) (-1.274)
Δ Ideology 0.468* 0.160 0.477* -0.634 0.990
(1.692) (0.409) (1.693) (-0.706) (0.914)
Δ Fragmentation -0.725 -3.753 -0.759 0.067 1.968
(-0.631) (-1.468) (-0.430) (0.019) (0.242)
Germany -1.583*** -2.311* -1.631 0.604
(-4.495) (-1.740) (-1.297) (0.320)
Δ Exp. decent. -0.229** -0.067 -0.229** -0.090 -1.055**
(-2.128) (-0.514) (-2.065) (-0.280) (-2.040)
Δ Tax decent. -0.047 -0.030 -0.062 0.158 0.411
(-0.338) (-0.188) (-0.832) (0.609) (0.674)
Δ Grant share -0.015 -0.137* -0.019 -0.060 0.023
(-0.149) (-1.911) (-0.281) (-0.630) (0.093)
N 293 293 293 85 68
F / 휒2 5910.903 10.867 28.556 10.260 22.298
푅¯2 0.424 0.441 0.701 0.724
RMS error 3.010 3.248 2.912 2.336 1.526
1 t-statistics are shown in parentheses
2 Hypothesis tests are based on robust standard errors (except in PCSE model)
3 Estimates for cross-section and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not shown
4 Model signiﬁcance is evaluated either with a F (in FE models) - or a 휒2 (in PCSE model) statistic
Tab. 10: Regressions of change of debt to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975 to 2001;
outliers
Outlier 1 Outlier 2 Outlier 3 Outlier 4 Outlier 5
(Studentized r) (Negative debt) (Without USA) (Without BEL) (Without ESP)
Δ Population -1.009*** -1.043*** -1.056*** -1.091*** -1.049***
(-11.752) (-9.967) (-10.708) (-11.648) (-10.971)
Δ Inﬂation -0.202 -0.035 -0.128 -0.092 -0.070
(-1.474) (-0.178) (-0.699) (-0.573) (-0.422)
Δ Working age -1.821* -1.978 -1.923 -2.433** -1.439
(-1.737) (-1.471) (-1.519) (-2.075) (-1.255)
Δ Openness 0.094 0.194** 0.167* 0.176** 0.173**
(1.468) (2.064) (1.854) (2.037) (2.067)
Δ GDP growth 0.142 0.101 0.130 0.159 0.119
(1.549) (0.627) (0.954) (1.487) (0.948)
Δ Unemployment 0.285 0.196 0.155 0.126 0.208
(1.298) (0.678) (0.596) (0.505) (0.793)
Δ Interest rate -0.648*** -0.342 -0.542** -0.537*** -0.536***
(-3.401) (-1.623) (-2.556) (-2.784) (-2.647)
Δ Ideology 0.401* 0.455 0.483* 0.533* 0.527*
(1.711) (1.234) (1.717) (1.877) (1.855)
Δ Fragmentation -0.784 -1.488 -0.764 -1.352 -0.891
(-0.512) (-0.635) (-0.441) (-0.785) (-0.502)
Germany -1.453 -1.590 -1.494 -0.763 -1.655
(-1.251) (-1.212) (-1.200) (-0.620) (-1.307)
Δ Exp. decent. -0.216** -0.199 -0.241** -0.240** -0.223**
(-2.158) (-1.455) (-2.114) (-2.157) (-1.983)
Δ Tax decent. 0.030 -0.064 -0.064 0.087 -0.039
(0.233) (-0.342) (-0.451) (0.539) (-0.242)
Δ Grant share -0.062 -0.000 -0.029 -0.019 -0.010
(-0.977) (-0.000) (-0.384) (-0.245) (-0.137)
N 283 236 270 273 286
F 36.039 20.310 40.680 33.198 29.191
푅¯2 0.543 0.429 0.435 0.487 0.440
RMS error 2.381 2.955 2.991 2.733 2.930
1 t-statistics are shown in parentheses
2 Hypothesis tests are based on robust standard errors
3 Estimates for cross-section and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not shown
Tab. 11: Regressions of change of debt to GDP ratio on decentralization measures; 1975 to 2001;
GMM estimations
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 5
(Unemployment) (Inﬂation) (Interest rate) (Joint) (Joint & addi-
tional IV)
Δ Population -1.335*** -1.062*** -1.138*** -1.082* -1.055***
(-6.605) (-10.935) (-5.733) (-1.881) (-10.279)
Δ Inﬂation -0.465* 0.429 -0.723 0.644 0.307
(-1.706) (0.819) (-0.866) (0.108) (0.585)
Δ Working age 0.192 -1.316 -0.191 -1.686 -1.861
(0.129) (-1.183) (-0.069) (-0.198) (-1.440)
Δ Openness 0.325*** 0.153* 0.234* 0.110 0.173*
(2.928) (1.802) (1.672) (0.169) (1.831)
Δ GDP growth -0.146 0.236 -0.059 0.315 0.186
(-0.687) (1.309) (-0.196) (0.175) (0.864)
Δ Unemployment -2.702 0.351 0.683 1.325 0.164
(-1.641) (1.215) (0.808) (0.300) (0.255)
Δ Interest rate -1.087*** -0.915*** 4.217 1.102 -1.506*
(-2.956) (-3.024) (0.644) (0.066) (-1.651)
Δ Ideology 0.232 0.301 0.190 0.321 0.279
(0.788) (1.094) (0.318) (0.292) (1.087)
Δ Fragmentation -0.214 -0.084 -4.517 -2.377 0.453
(-0.119) (-0.049) (-0.735) (-0.165) (0.223)
Germany -3.039** -1.820 -2.133 -1.630 -1.644
(-2.173) (-1.526) (-1.113) (-0.418) (-1.379)
Δ Exp. decent. -0.652** -0.291** -0.187 -0.194 -0.297**
(-2.434) (-2.481) (-0.789) (-0.557) (-1.983)
Δ Tax decent. 0.095 -0.008 -0.054 0.016 -0.043
(0.391) (-0.053) (-0.180) (0.042) (-0.316)
Δ Grant share 0.074 -0.014 -0.103 -0.063 -0.024
(0.649) (-0.190) (-0.529) (-0.248) (-0.330)
N 287 287 287 287 282
F 13.008 26.806 6.640 6.065 22.143
RMS error 3.399 2.872 4.405 3.338 2.889
Overid. test 0.454 0.189 0.705 0.286 0.161
Underid. test 0.060 0.049 0.880 0.915 0.046
1 t-statistics are shown in parentheses
2 Hypothesis tests are based on robust standard errors
3 Estimates for cross-section and time-ﬁxed eﬀects are not shown
4 The p-values (not the test-statistics) for the under- and overidentiﬁcation tests are reported at the bottom of the table
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Fig. 1: Development of decentralization mea-
sures, mean across countries
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Fig. 2: Net ﬁnancial liabilities and exp. decen-
tralization
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Fig. 3: Net ﬁnancial liabilities and tax decentral-
ization
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GERICE
ITA
NLD
NOR
PRT
SWE
USA
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
N
et
 fi
na
nc
ia
l li
ab
ilit
ie
s 
(av
era
ge
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Grant share (average)
Fig. 4: Net ﬁnancial liabilities and grant share
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